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Abstract
This account of judicialised politics in the Nigerian transition experience examines the regu-
lation of the judiciary of the political space, through the resolution of intergovernmental contes-
tations in a dysfunctional federation. It analyses the judicialisation of elite power disputes which
have resonance for due process and the rule of law in particular and governance in general. A
study of the role of the judiciary in stabilising the country, itself a pivot in the West Africa region
in particular and Africa in general, is important. This is especially in view of its classification as
a ‘weak state,’ despite its enormous human and natural resources. The analyses here suggest the
Supreme Court has taken a strategic position in the task of democratic institutional building and
the reinstitution of the rule of law in the country. This strategic measure has received the acclaim
of the public. However, the account also discloses that the judiciary, in the course of its numerous
interventions, has been drawn into overly political disputes that overreach its jurisprudential pref-
erences. Of even more significance, it demonstrates that the judiciary is itself still challenged by
institutional dysfunctions constituting part of the legacies of the authoritarian era. The situation
leads back to the need for closer scrutiny of the judicial function in transitional societies.
KEYWORDS: judicialisation of politics, transition, constitutional courts, due process, Nigeria,
politicisation of judiciary, due process, rule of law
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velopment (CARRD), Leicester, UK. I am grateful to Scot Veitch for his comments on parts of
an earlier version of this article. I am also grateful to Karimat Bakare-Yusuf for her constant and
stimulating discussions with me on the theme of this research.
 Introduction 
Nigeria’s political transition from three decades of authoritarian military rule to 
democracy constitutes a momentous aspect of the country’s political history. It is 
of moment for instance, that the country has witnessed its longest experience of 
civil ‘democratic' rule in its post-colonial history from the culmination of the 
handover of power by the military on 29 May 1999 till date, after a series of 
unending transitions. 
  Equally epochal is the 2007 general elections in the country. It marked 
the first successful ‘civil-civil’ political transition. By the civil-civil transition is 
meant the transfer of power from one elected government to another devoid of 
military intervention in governance. Recognition of the salience of the elections is 
of course without prejudice to the fact that they have turned out to be the most 
contested in the country’s chequered electoral history.  
The widespread contestations are no doubt a fall-out of the very suspect 
democratic credentials of the elections. The level of concomitant judicialisation of 
politics electoral contestations have engendered, has contributed in no small 
measure to the unprecedented expansion of judicial power and its impact on 
governance examined in this article.  
   But by far the most remarkable feature of the transition from military 
authoritarianism is the judicialisation of ‘pure politics’1 and the unprecedented 
rise of judicial power in the country’s transition experience. In this regard, one of 
Hirschl’s classifications of the multi-dimensional facets of judicialisation of 
politics is quite relevant. He observes that the judicialisation of ‘mega-politics’ (or 
pure politics) as a type of judicialised politics, manifests in various forms.  
Manifestation of the judicialisation of pure politics includes judicial 
monitoring of executive policies in economic planning, national security and 
other prerogatives of executive power under the rubric of the ‘political question.’ 
Others relate to restorative justice measures, regime transformation and 
legitimation, as well as collective, fundamental existential and identity questions 
of statehood. He further identifies in this category, the judicialisation of 
democratic electoral processes. 2  Hirschl’s definition of pure politics as the 
transfer to the courts of matters that are of a decidedly political nature and 
significance is adopted for its aptness to the Nigerian situation analysed here.3  
   In the Nigerian experience, judicialised politics4 has been cross-cutting. 
The judicialisation of the process of democratisation, power contestation among 
                                                 
1 Ran Hirschl “The New Constitutionalism and the Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide” 
(2006) 75 (2) Fordham Law Review 721. 
2 Ibid. at 727. 
3 Hirschl note 1 supra at 723. 
4  In this article, I use the terms ‘judicialisation of politics’ and ‘judicialised politics’ 
interchangeably.   
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 the political elite, inter-governmental policy and legislation issues, have had 
profound impact on politics and governance in the age of new constitutionalism. 
‘Judicialization of this type’ Hirschl further observes, has resulted in the judiciary 
adjudicating and deciding ‘watershed political questions,’ not expressly provided 
for in the constitutions of the respective countries.5  
The literature shows the phenomenon has become widespread across the 
spectrum of advanced, liberal, young and aspiring democratic polities alike.6 And 
as Moustafa recently noted, even authoritarian societies are not left out.7 In the 
Nigerian experience of democratisation, the politics of transition has been so 
judicialised that the Supreme Court, the apex court in the country, has been 
nominated for the last two consecutive years, as the institution or ‘Man of the 
Year.’8 
This account of judicialised politics in the Nigerian transition experience 
examines the regulation of the judiciary of the political space, through the 
resolution of intergovernmental contestations in a dysfunctional federation. It 
analyses the judicialisation of elite power disputes which have resonance for due 
process and rule of law in particular and governance in general. A study of the 
role of the judiciary in stabilising the country, itself a pivot in the West Africa 
region in particular and Africa in general, is important, especially in view of its 
classification as a ‘weak state’9 despite its enormous human and natural resources.  
The conduct of governance at the centre, and the tension it has generated 
within the polity, is a stark reminder of the rather problematic operation of 
                                                 
5 Hirschl note 1 supra at 728. 
6 See John Ferejohn “Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law” (2002) 65 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 41, 43-44,  Tom Ginsburg Judicial Review in New Democracies (Cambridge University 
Press Cambridge 2003), Tate C Neal “Why the Expansion of Judicial Power” in Neal C Tate and 
Torbjorn Vallinder The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New-York University Press New-
York 1995) 28; Ruti Teitel “Post-Communist Constitutionalism: A Transitional Perspective” 
(1995) 26 (1) Columbia Human Rights Law Review 167; Jiri Priban Dissidents of Law (Ashgate 
Dartmouth Hampshire 2002); Wojciech Sadurski Rights Before Courts: A Study of Constitutional 
Courts in Post Communist States of Central and Eastern Europe (Springer Dordrecht 2005); Tom 
Ginsburg and Gombosuren Ganzorig “When Courts and Politics Collide: Mongolia’s 
Constitutional Crisis” (2000-2001) 14 (2) Columbia Journal of Asian Law 309; Heinz Klug 
Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism and South Africa’s Political Reconstruction (Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 2000. 
7  Tamir Moustafa The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics and Economic 
Development in Egypt (Cambridge University Press Cambridge MA 2007). 
8 Onyema Omenuwa “2007: The Year of the Supreme Court” The Daily Independent Online 
Edition (Lagos Thursday 27 December 2007) available at 
 http://www.independentngonline.com/?c=129&a=7908 (February 20 2008). 
9 Susan E Rice and Patrick Stewart Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (Brookings 
Institution Washington D.C 2008) available at: 
 http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index.aspx (last accessed 11 March 
2008). 
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 federalism in Nigeria. As the record of the experience of federalism in other parts 
of Africa has shown, the Nigerian situation is not unique in this regard. 10 
However, as Adamolekun and Kincaid have noted, the problem is due, not so 
much to the inadequacies of federalism as a form of political arrangement, as to 
the botched attempts at democratic governance that has plagued post-colonial 
Africa.11 
The judicialisation of politics essentially presupposes a more visible 
presence of the judiciary in political and social life. It results in the transformation 
of the legal and political culture in a polity. The courts emerge in the social milieu 
as the forum of choice for the ‘social redress and rights claims.’12 This has been 
prominent in transitions to democracy in post authoritarian societies of South-East 
Asia, Central and Eastern Europe and Africa. Thus, it is relevant to this account to 
proceed with an evaluation of comparative perspectives of experiences of the 
judicialisation of politics in transitional societies in diverse regions of the world. 
They provide a viable analytical template for the evaluation of the Nigerian 
experience to which we return later.  
   
Comparative Perspectives  
In a study of the establishment and workings of constitutional courts in political 
transitions from authoritarian (one-party), communist or military rule in four 
countries in South-East Asia, Ginsburg observed the dramatic rise of judicial 
review of legislative and executive action.13 There is increasing judicial restraint 
on the exercise of political power in Taiwan, Korea, Mongolia and Thailand. All 
of these in a region reputed for the near-total absence of effective judicial review 
on the actions of powerful executives. In the aftermath of transition to democratic 
rule in these countries, the (constitutional) courts have become ‘important sites of 
political contestation…to achieve social change.’14  
    Judicial intervention and activity on various fronts have had deep 
resonance for governance in the region. The courts have struck at ‘elements of the 
old system,’ including corruption, while providing a platform for the resolution of 
conflict among political players. In the political transition of these countries, 
                                                 
10 Ladipo Adamolekun and John Kincaid “The Federal Solution: Assessment and Prognosis for 
Nigeria and Africa” (1991) 21 (4) Publius: The Journal of Federalism 173. 
11 Ibid. at 174. 
12 Pilar Domingo “Judicialization of Politics: The Changing Political Role of the Judiciary in 
Mexico” in Rachel Sieder, Line Schjolden and Alan Angell (eds.) The Judicialization of Politics in 
Latin America (Palgrave Macmillan New-York 2005) 21, 22-23. 
13 Tom Ginsburg “Constitutional Courts in New Democracies: Understanding Variations in East 
Asia” (2002) 2 (1) Global Jurist (Advances Article 4) 1, 3. Available at: 
http/www.bepress.com/gj/vol2/iss1/art4.  
14 Ibid. at 9. 
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 courts and judges have played a significant role ‘underpinning and facilitating 
democratisation.’ 15  They have thus become active participants in the 
democratisation project.16 
  In Central and Eastern Europe, constitutional courts have taken on head 
long, some of the most vexed social issues and political challenges confronting 
the liberal democratisation process. They have intervened in and moderated the 
course of post-totalitarian transitional justice measures, like prosecution of alleged 
violators of human rights and lustrations,17 all with considerable resonance for 
politics and governance in the so-called ‘velvet revolutions’ of Central and 
Eastern Europe.18  
   Thus, the Constitutional Court of Hungary ruled in the Zetenyi Law 
Case, 19  that the law passed by parliament for the prosecution of communist 
political crimes was unconstitutional. It held that the Zetenyi Law was 
retrospective and in violation of the principle of legal security, one of the 
cornerstones of rule of law. 20 The decision effectively blocked the prosecution of 
serious crimes committed during the communist era for being inconsistent with 
the newly amended Hungarian Constitution.21  
   As Priban further notes, the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic 
in contrast, upheld the legitimacy of similar legislation in its review of the “Act 
on Lawlessness of the Communist Regime and the Resistance Against It,” 
presumably in a manner that sought to balance the tension between impunity and 
retrospectivity.22 More than that, the Czech Constitutional Court has played ‘an 
enormous role’ in the ‘re-modernisation’ of Czech society.23  
Assessing the work of the Czech Republic Constitutional Court, Priban 
observes that ‘The moralist and political vocabulary of the Court’s judgment’ has 
gone ‘beyond the usual limits’ employed by similar courts in liberal, well 
established democracies.24 The Court extended its purview beyond strictly legal 
                                                 
15 Ginsburg note 6 supra at 15. 
16 Ibid. at 24. 
17 See Sadurski note 6 supra at 221-262 for detailed consideration of judicial review of lustration 
legislation and measures in Central and Eastern Europe. 
18 Sadurski note 6 supra. 
19 Judgment of March 5, 1992, 1992/11 ABH. 77 pt V(5) (Hung.) dealing with  the “Law on the 
Right to Prosecute Serious Criminal Offences Committed Between December 21, 1944 and May 
2, 1990, That had Not been Prosecuted for Political Reasons” November 4, 1991. Quoted in Ruti 
Teitel “Paradoxes in the Revolution of the Rule of Law” (1994) 19 Yale Journal of International 
Law. 239.  
20 Priban note 6 supra at 89. 
21 Teitel note 19 supra at 240-241. 
22 Priban note 6 supra at 100-109. 
23 Priban note 6 supra. at 96. 
24 Priban Note 6 at 96. 
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 contexts, to explication of moral and political requisites for a society based on law 
and democracy.25 The trend has been replicated in Poland and Unified Germany.26   
   Teitel agrees with Priban that the jurisprudence of the constitutional 
courts in Central Eastern Europe have extended the traditional realms of judicial 
review. 27 She posits that in the process, the courts have gone on to establish a 
‘newfound source of political legitimacy.’28  The legitimating function derives 
from the liberal locus afforded to individuals (and presumably groups) to actively 
challenge political action, signalling a ‘new governmental openness.’29 
 I will argue below that despite scholarly scepticism on the democratic 
credentials of the activist judicial approach, based partly on its perceived potential 
of fostering legislative irresponsibility, 30  the judiciary in Nigeria’s fragile 
transition is recognised to have taken on this role ascribed by Teitel to the 
constitutional courts in Central and Eastern Europe with significant impact on 
democratisation and governance in the country. 
   The constitutional courts have changed the ‘constitutional culture’31 by 
limiting hitherto unbridled state power.  The propriety of judicial review of rights 
and policy issues or in the language of this discourse, the judicialisation of 
politics, has been viewed with much scepticism by scholars like Sadurski.32 But 
there is hardly any contention that constitutional courts in Central and Eastern 
Europe have generally given force to rights provisions which for decades had not 
been worth the paper they were written on. 33  They have also limited 
parliamentary action, striking down legislations and policies they deemed out of 
tune with constitutional provisions.34  The courts have actively participated or 
sometimes taken the lead in setting an agenda of liberalism for the new 
government.35  
   Not surprisingly, varying responses from the political branches of 
government and the public, have trailed the exercise of wide ranging powers of 
constitutional judicial review. The responses have ranged from grudging 
compliance, to considerable resistance and emergence of serious tensions between 
                                                 
25 Priban note 6 supra at 114-155. 
26 Ibid. at 97-99. 
27 Teitel note 6 supra at 182-187. 
28 Ibid. at 186. 
29 Teitel note 6 supra at 186. 
30 Sadurski note 6 supra at 289-299. 
31 Teitel note 6 supra at 169. 
32 Sadurski 6 supra. 
33 But Sadurski cautions however that ‘more nuanced’ evaluation of the records disclose a less 
rosy picture. Sadurski note 6 supra at 289-290.  
34 Teitel note 6 supra at 176-182. 
35 Ruti G Teitel “Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation” (1996-
7) 106 (7) Yale L.J 2009 at 2009, 2023. 
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 the judiciary and the political branches. The Mongolian experience demonstrates 
this reasonably well.36  
   The Constitutional Court of South Africa is unique. While similar courts 
elsewhere have been actively involved in shaping policy and governance in 
transitioning polities, it played a cardinal role in the constitutive process of 
transition from apartheid to popular democracy in the rainbow nation.37 With a 
view to address the inverse concerns of the parties that negotiated the South 
Africa transition through an institutionalised and independent forum, the 
Constitutional Court was vested powers that ‘had never before been imparted on 
any court.’38  
The Constitutional Court played an important role in the institutional 
design of a new nation by its thorough scrutiny and initial rejection of the 
proposed provisions of the permanent constitution for South Africa.39 It rejected 
attempts at limiting judicial review, insisted on adequate safeguards for separation 
of powers as well as structural and fiscal federalism.40   
   The Constitutional Court further required the incorporation of 
international human rights standards in the new constitution and sought to 
maintain critical balance between majoritarian control and minority rights. It thus 
acted on the powers conferred on it by the Interim Constitution of South Africa, to 
ensure strict adherence to the principles agreed by the negotiating parties.41  
   Further, the decisions of the Constitutional Court on the Bill of Rights in 
the South-African constitution, including those on economic and social rights as 
in Grootboom, 42  have had significant impact on policy and governance in a 
country struggling to come to terms with a harrowing past for the majority, and 
aspirations to forge an inclusive, egalitarian future for all. The South Africa 
Constitutional Court has been noted for holding a delicate balance between 
competing interests that could threaten the body politic.43    
   If the Constitutional Court of South Africa has been unique in its 
functioning, the impact of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt, on socio-
economic and political issues in the country, broke away from the common 
                                                 
36 Ginsburg and Gombosuren note 6 supra. 
37 Klug note 6 supra. 
38 Samuel Isaacharoff “Constitutionalizing Democracy in Fractured Societies” (2004) 82 Texas 
Law Review 1861 (-1893) 1874. 
39 In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) 
(S.Afr); In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1997 (2) SA 97 
(CC) (S.Afr).  
40 Isaacharoff note 38 supra at 1878-1879. 
41 Ibid. at 1879. 
42 Government of the Republic of South Africa & Others v Grootboom & Others (2000) SACLR 
LEXIS 126. 
43 Isaacharoff note 38 supra 1893. 
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 wisdom on a central feature of judicialisation of politics. Established by an 
authoritarian regime, it challenged the theoretical position that a democratic 
dispensation is sine qua non for judicialisation of politics.44 
   The authoritarian regime in Egypt established the constitutional court 
essentially with an economic, rather than a socio-political agenda. Confronted 
with economic depression at home, and international pressure from abroad, the 
government established the court to assure foreign investors of its commitment to 
economic liberalism and preservation of private property rights away from its 
historical record of nationalisation of private corporations and investments in the 
country. It hoped to achieve this through what would be regarded as an 
independent judicial review mechanism. 45  
   According to Moustafa, the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) not 
only effectively assisted the government to push through its new liberalised 
economic vision through striking down of socialist oriented legislations, it also 
provided an acceptable forum for the ventilation of hitherto repressed opposition 
views. It has also played a key role in securing property and advancing political 
rights of individuals and groups,46 with the latter especially, to the discomfiture of 
its authoritarian creators.  
   Despite its rather moderate activism,47 the decisions of the SCC opened 
up the space for the ventilation of opposition views on an institutional platform, 
with the SCC acting as an interface between state and society. 48 Its decisions on 
private property rights constituted a veritable outlet for policies desired by the 
government but from which it exercised considerable reticence in the 
apprehension of public outrage.49  
In testimony to the visible power of the SCC over policy, the government 
later adopted various extra-legal measures to curb its progressive jurisprudence.50 
Notwithstanding these measures, the SCC impacted significantly on the course of 
governance in the country. It substantially established its position as an institution 
not only for economic liberalisation as conceived by its creators, but the choice 
institution of resort for political emancipation.51   
   It can be fairly asserted that distrust for inherited, complicit, state 
institutions in transitioning polities, has played a significant role in the sometimes 
                                                 
44 Tate C Neal “Why the Expansion of Judicial Power” in Neal C Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder The 
Global Expansion of Judicial Power (New-York University Press New-York 1995) 28 
45 Tamir Moustafa “Law Versus the State: The Judicialisation of Politics in Egypt” (2003) 28 (4) 
Law and Social Inquiry 883, 895-896. 
46 Moustafa note 43 supra. at 914-921. 
47 Ibid. at 903-907. 
48 Ibid. at 894-903. 
49 Ibid. at 908-913. 
50 Ibid. at 914-926 
51 Ibid. at 926-927. 
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 uncritical social approval of newly created ones. The courts, new institutions that 
they are, have arguably benefited immensely from what Teitel refers to as the 
‘legitimacy of hope’ that surrounds institutions that offer fresh beginnings.52  
However, it is pertinent to reflect on whether the assumption that a new 
judicial institution is the only viable approach to ensuring judicial promotion and 
protection of democratic values and rule of law in transitioning polities. The 
absence of such courts in Nigeria’s transition offers an opportunity for such 
reflection. 
 
A flawed federation, inter-governmental relations and the courts  
This aspect of the paper focuses on the judicialisation of politics through the 
mechanism of what Adrienne Stone refers to as ‘structural judicial review.’ 
Structural judicial review is the process, in federal polities with written 
constitutions, whereby judges interpret and enforce constitutional provisions that 
relate to the basic structure of government. 53  ‘Structural provisions’ in 
constitutional theory, she states further, ‘are those that lay down rules about how, 
where and when institutions of government operate.’54 The provisions that divide 
power between constituent parts are some of the most important.55  
On this view, structural judicial review has played a key role in 
judicialised politics in Nigeria’s most recent judicial and political history. Unlike 
Stone’s objections to structural review,56 the position taken here is that structural 
judicial review, particularly in transitional contexts confronting the challenge of 
distorted federalism among other institutional distortions, constitutes a more 
reliable mechanism for achieving a balance of power and deepening democracy. 
The Nigerian transition experience furnishes ample support for this position. 
In the post-authoritarian military period in Nigeria, particularly between 
1999 and 2006, disputations on the appropriate spheres of power and control 
between the Federal Government on one hand, and the states on the other, were 
frequent. As a result, there was seeming endless recourse to the judiciary for 
resolution. Customisation of this approach to governance and the extensive 
judicialisation of politics it generated attracted judicial notice and obiter dicta of 
the Supreme Court, the judicial venue for their resolution.  
 In a recent decision, Attorney General of Abia & 2 Ors v Attorney 
General of the Federation & 33 Ors,57 the Supreme Court observed that it was 
                                                 
52 Teitel note 19 supra at 246. 
53  Adrienne Stone “Judicial Review without Rights: Some Problems for the Democratic 
Legitimacy of Structural Judicial Review” (2008) 28 (1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 2. 
54 Ibid. at 3. 
55 Ibid. at 4. 
56 Ibid. at 20-30. 
57 (2006) 7 NILR 71. 
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 ‘yet another open quarrel between the State and Federal Government’ with which 
the Court had become ‘thoroughly familiar.’58 The Court noted that the cases 
revolved around federalism and unitarism from the constitutional and political 
stand-point. This is not surprising.  
   The transition away from military authoritarianism has forced on to the 
centre stage of governance, tensions arising from the country’s de jure federal 
status which has witnessed an accelerated transformation to a de facto unitary 
polity. Inherent tensions between the two leanings were accentuated by a 
government at the centre, headed by a former military ruler. Despite his 
internationally recognised status as an African statesman as well as former 
dictator-turned-democrat, he soon relapsed into instrumentalist understandings of 
rule of law in the conduct of governance in the country.59 
   There are numerous remarkable cases of judicialised politics in the 
country in the context of the democratic transition at the inter-governmental 
level. 60  Some of the most notable ones include Attorney General of the 
Federation v Attorney General of Abia and 35 Ors61 which deals with disputed 
claims between the federal and littoral States for oil resources derivable from the 
continental shelf of the country; Attorney General of Ondo State v Attorney 
General of the Federation & 35 Ors (the ICPC Case),62 centres on disputations 
around the creation of a monolith anti-corruption agency in the federation through 
federal legislation. 
 Attorney General of the Federation v Attorney General of Abia & 35 Ors 
(No.2) 63  and Attorney General of Ogun State v Attorney General of the 
Federation64 both relate to contestations on fiscal federalism, specifically arising 
from the distribution of revenue and allegations of illegal withholding of statutory 
allocations by the Federal Government. In Attorney General of Lagos State v 
Attorney General of the Federation,65 the Lagos State Government,66 challenged 
the propriety of inherited military legislation which purported to confer ultimate 
planning powers on the Federal Government despite the fact that the latter is 
vested with administrative control of only the federal capital territory.  
 
                                                 
58 Ibid. at 2 supra. 
59 See generally, Philip C Aka “Nigeria since May 1999: Understanding the Paradox of Civil Rule 
and Human Rights Violations under President Obasanjo” (2003) 4 San Diego International Journal 
of Law 209.  
60 And that number is by no means exhaustive of this line of cases. 
61 (2002) 4 SC Pt I, 1.  
62 (2002) 6 S.C. Pt I, 1. 
63 (2002) NWLR 542 S.C 
64 (2002) 12 SC Pt II, 1. 
65 (2003) 6 SC Pt I, 24. 
66 One of 36 in the country. The country also has a Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. 
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 The Electoral Act Case- Taking on the Locals  
However, this account will focus on Attorney General of Abia & 35 Ors v 
Attorney General of the Federation. (The Electoral Act Case)67 The case, as the 
present analysis discloses, offers opportunity for a composite examination of the 
various dimensions of judicialisation of politics as it relates to judicial 
intervention in, and resolution of inter-governmental disputes in the post-
authoritarian period in Nigeria.   
The Plaintiffs, all the states of the federation, challenged the 
constitutionality of certain provisions of the Electoral Act 2001 (the Act), a law 
passed by the National Assembly (the legislature) and assented by the President, 
for conduct and regulation of elections into federal, state and local government 
levels. It thus included provisions on the procedure for local government 
elections, determination of election petitions arising from the elections and 
electoral offences, all of which were challenged by the Plaintiffs.  
The core of the case for the States/Plaintiffs was that the National 
Assembly had far exceeded its legislative jurisdictional competence in various 
provisions of the Act. They alleged the action of the federal executive and 
legislature threatened the very existence of the country. The Plaintiffs essentially 
based their claims on section 7 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1999 (the Constitution).  
The section guarantees the system of local governments in the country. It 
further directs state governments to ensure their existence through a law that 
provides for their establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions. 
They argued that the Act which sought in part to alter the tenure of local 
government chairman and councillors, was in clear excess of jurisdiction except 
as it relates to the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja which was under the direct 
administration of the President and over which the National Assembly had 
exclusive legislative competence under the Constitution.68  
The Plaintiffs further relied on the provisions of Item 11 in the Concurrent 
List of the Constitution to argue that the National Assembly only had the limited 
jurisdiction to enact legislation for the purposes of ‘registration of voters and the 
procedure regulating elections to a Local Government.’ 69  In addition, the 
Plaintiffs also had recourse to the provisions of section 197 of the Constitution.  
According to the Plaintiffs, the express provisions of section 197 of the 
Constitution which establish a State Independent Electoral Commission for each 
state, with enabling powers to conduct local government elections, the Plaintiffs 
urged the Court to hold that it is the House of Assembly of a State alone that has 
                                                 
67 (2003) 3 SC 106. 
68  Ibid. at 113 to 122. 
69 The Electoral Act Case note 67 at 122. 
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 the power to prescribe, increase or otherwise alter the tenure of elected local 
government officers.  
They further sought declarations that the National Assembly had no power 
to make laws for the conduct of elections in to local government councils, 
delimitation of wards for such elections, setting qualification criteria, the date for 
the elections and other sundry matters relating to the elections. All of these was, 
in save as they relate to the Federal Capital Territory, which as mentioned earlier, 
was a constitutionally created mayoralty of the Federal Government. In sum, the 
Plaintiffs urged the Court, in view of their claims that sections 15-73 and 110-122 
of the Electoral Act contravened the Constitution, to declare the Act as a whole 
null and void.    
The States/Plaintiffs claims of excess of jurisdiction were vigorously 
contested by the Federal Government/Defendant. The Defendant contended that 
the constitutionally allotted powers of the Plaintiffs with regards to regulation of 
elections into local governments were intact. The Federal Government argued the 
National Assembly acted under the provisions of section 4 (2) of the Constitution. 
The provisions vested the National Assembly with the power to make laws for the 
‘peace, order and good government’ of the federation or any part of it in relation 
to matters under the Exclusive Legislative List. The Defendant also claimed that 
the National Assembly had ‘inherent constitutional powers’ to determine the 
tenure of elected officers of local government councils.70 
For an understanding of the context of the case, it is essential to note that 
there is an allocation of legislative powers between the two tiers of government in 
the second schedule to the Constitution. The ‘Exclusive Legislative List’ itemises 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal (central) government while the 
‘Concurrent Legislative List’ specifies the shared sphere of legislative powers 
between them. In Nigerian constitutional theory and practice, there is a deemed 
Residual Legislative List, a fact adverted to by the Plaintiffs in the case, to be the 
exclusive jurisdiction of respective state governments on unlisted matters.  
The Court found for the Plaintiffs that the National Assembly could not 
validly pass legislation to alter the tenure of elected local government officers 
except as it relates to the Federal Capital Territory. While the Court rejected the 
claim for a declaration that the National Assembly could not legislate for the 
registration of voters, the justices nonetheless upheld the argument that the 
National Assembly could not legislate for the delimitation of wards for the local 
government council elections.  
The Court further held that the National Assembly was not the proper 
authority to set a date for the conduct of the elections, stipulate qualification 
criteria for candidates and the conditions for vacation of office by elected officials 
                                                 
70 Ibid. at 118. 
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 of the councils, again with the exception of the Federal Capital Territory as 
canvassed by the Plaintiffs. In this, the Court rejected the ‘peace, order and good 
government’ argument of the Defendant. The power, the Court stated, applied 
only to those matters over which the National Assembly had legislative authority.  
In response to the Plaintiffs’ prayer that the Act be completely voided, the 
Court preferred to carry out a section-by-section examination to determine the 
constitutionality of the provisions. In the process, the Court struck down various 
sections of the Act for being inconsistent with the constitution, duplicity or for 
lack of legislative competence on the part of the National Assembly.  
It also dismissed the Defendant’s argument that the Act was passed 
pursuant to inherent powers of the National Assembly. It emphasised that the 
National Assembly as a creation of the Constitution, derives all its powers from 
the latter. ‘Inherent powers,’ as the Supreme Court noted, were exclusively 
conferred on the courts by the Constitution.71 Justice Kutigi in the lead judgement 
aptly summed the position of the Court on the matter when he observed that: 
  
“[...] the Electoral Act as a whole is a mix-up, a confusion, because 
the National Assembly seemed to have treated its powers with 
respect to Federal elections as if it were co-extensive with its 
powers over Local Government elections. They were wrong…a 
few provisions of the Act are good but quite a large number of 
them are bad and had been struck- out.”72 
 
Judicial Pacifism versus Executive Lawlessness 
A significant feature of the judicial attitude in this case is a discernible 
pacifist approach adopted by the learned justices of the Supreme Court to blunt 
the sometimes rather sharp edges of the disagreements that characterised the 
relationship between the states, especially those governed by opposition parties, 
and the Federal Government in the Obasanjo administration. Executive excesses 
and outright violations of the most basic elements of the federal principle were so 
common as to be a customised approach to governance by the Federal 
Government during President Obasanjo’s tenure. The considerable litigation it 
generated constituted an unwarranted diversion of resources and attention from 
governance at all levels.  
But notice that despite the declaration that the National Assembly busied 
itself with making laws clearly ultra vires, the Court applied the ‘blue pencil rule’ 
to severe the unconstitutional provisions of the Electoral Act and saved the non-
offending sections of it. In this, the Court was following its precedent in a number 
of earlier decisions on this point. It was repeated in several cases challenging 
                                                 
71 Electoral Act Case note 67 supra at 185-186. 
72 Ibid. at 132. 
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 federal legislative excess or unconstitutionality usually with positive results.73 As 
the Court noted, ‘The function of the Court in a situation like this is to save as 
much as possible the provisions of the legislation that is under attack.’74  
The measured judicial approach was however not reciprocated by the 
Federal Government. For one, rather than abate, the spate of similar legislation, 
usually generated as executive bills, multiplied. And so did the legal challenges to 
them. For another, the President Obasanjo-led executive (who invariably had 
control over execution of most of the respective judgements) became notorious 
for non-execution of the various judgements against it. The attitude of the Federal 
Government brought to the fore, Schor’s observation that the effectiveness of 
courts in promoting due process depend not so much on judicial power itself, but 
the willingness of other relevant actors to implement its decisions.75  
The proclaimed determination of President Yar’Adua, Obasanjo’s 
successor, to prompt enforcement of judicial decisions affecting the government 
however suggests that the judicial commitment to trumping the ‘un-rule of law’76 
should be encouraged, even in the face of seemingly intractable disregard for due 
process.  
Judicial independence and candour is quite important in reinstituting rule 
of law in post-authoritarian transitions. In such settings, concerted efforts are 
required to wean the political branch, commonly dominated by an elite largely 
composed of ‘transformed autocrats’ and acolytes or protégés of former 
authoritarian rulers now in positions of power, from an instrumentalist rule of law 
approach to governance.77 At the least, the judicial decisions which insist on 
constitutional due process, to paraphrase Dyzenhaus, prominently stands out as a 
rebuke to leaders who insist on arbitrariness in governance. The decisions of the 
courts will at least wait till the political elite in particular and society in general, 
develops a ‘rule-of-law sense.’78     
From the perspective of both law and politics, perhaps the most salient 
feature of the Electoral Act Case in the context of the democratic transition in the 
country is the firm position of the Supreme Court against the attempt of the 
federal government to control all incidences revolving around securing political 
                                                 
73 See for instance ICPC Case note 62 supra at 32-33. 
74 Electoral Act Case note 67 supra at 208. 
75 Miguel Schor “The Rule of Law” (2006)  Paper 30 Suffolk University Law School Faculty 
Publications 1(-12), 6-7 available at: 
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/PIP_Journal.cfm?pip_jrnl=955029  
76 Ibid. at 4-8.                                                                                                                                                                                   
77 For an insight on how this class dominate the political transition in Nigeria, see Hakeem O. 
Yusuf “The Judiciary and Constitutionalism in Transitions: A Critique” (2007) 7 (3) Global Jurist 
(Advances) 1, 9-10. Available at: http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol7/iss3/art4   
78 David Dyzenhaus The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 2006) 233. 
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 power at all levels of governance in the country. This is a design the party in 
power at the centre sought to achieve through its majority control of the National 
Assembly. The significance of this aspect of the matter is easily lost in the 
circumstance that the full context of the political terrain in Nigeria’s transition 
from military to civil rule is not elaborated here.  
 But it is important to this account to note that the Constitution provides 
for independent electoral commissions for the conduct of elections at the three 
tiers of government reflecting the country’s federal structure. It is the case that the 
electoral commissions are substantially manipulated and controlled by the 
respective governments at the centre and the states respectively, with the result 
that successive elections in the country have been any thing but transparent 
between 1999 and 2007 following the transition to civil rule.79  
Thus, jurisdiction-poaching, with its potential for extending the reach of 
those controlling the relevant election commission, in the electoral process 
remains quite attractive in political power configurations. The practice has been 
promoted, even where, as in this case, the route to achieving the objective is 
manifestly unconstitutional. The relevant constitutional provisions are so clear 
that the passage of the offending parts of the bill by the National Assembly can 
only be explained by the dominance of the ruling People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP) in the legislature and a preference for political disregard for constitutional 
values. Though judicial action of resisting jurisdiction-poaching is not likely to 
rectify the untoward incidence of electoral manipulation rampant in the country, it 
at least puts the political elite on notice to conduct power struggles within the 
ground rules. 
It is significant that barely three months later in the ICPC Case80 the Court 
validated the Federal Government’s establishment of a monolith anti-corruption 
agency for the country on the basis of the ‘peace, order and good government’ 
clause of section 4 of the Constitution. And at least one of the justices expressly 
conceded an explicit breach of the fundamental principles of federalism.81 This 
was justified by the Court’s evaluation of the enormity of the challenge corruption 
posed to governance and development in the country.  
The justices rightly noted its inapplicability in the Electoral Act Case. The 
obligation to prevent or combat corruption in issue in the ICPC Case was 
constitutionally conferred on all tiers of government, thus distinguishing it from 
the facts of the present case. Here, the Constitution expressly and exclusively 
vested the powers for the conduct of local government councils’ elections on the 
states, with the stated exception of procedure regulating elections and registration 
                                                 
79 See for instance International Crisis Group Nigeria: Failed Elections: Failing State Africa 
Report No.126 (30 May 2007). 
80 ICPC Case note 62 supra. For a discussion of this case see Yusuf note 77 supra at 26-32. 
81 ICPC Case note 62 supra at 59-61. 
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 of voters reserved for the National Assembly.  As Justice Ogundare stated, the 
legislature, state or federal, is bound to exercise its power only within the confines 
of stipulated parameters of the country’s written Constitution.82  
The position of the Court that the political branches operate within 
constitutionally defined limits is a critical measure for the reinstitution of rule of 
law in governance. It is a principle that was routinely observed in the breach by 
successive military regimes in the country. The transition to civil rule 
notwithstanding, the indecorous attitude of the political branch towards rule of 
law and constitutionality has fostered the culture of impunity in all facets of 
national life.  
 
‘Pure’ political disputes and separation of powers  
Attorney-General of the Federation & 2 Ors v Alhaji Atiku Abubakar (Vice 
President, Federal Republic of Nigeria) & 4 Ors (Atiku v Obasanjo)83 is a poster 
child for the incidence of judicialisation of politics in Nigeria’s democratic 
transition. The case is one of several suits filed by the 1st Respondent/Plaintiff 
(Plaintiff) to challenge attempts to remove him from office and prosecute him for 
alleged corruption. The situation is a direct fall-out of the long-drawn political 
differences between him and President Olusegun Obasanjo (the President).    
 
Atiku v Obasanjo- Taming Ambition 
The Plaintiff had been sworn in as Vice-President of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria on May 29 2003 alongside President Olusegun Obasanjo, for a second 
and final constitutionally prescribed four year-term on the ticket of the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP). However, the relationship between the two steadily 
deteriorated in the build-up to the 2007 elections because of what came to be 
known in Nigerian politics as ‘The Third Term Project.’84  
The Third Term Project refers to the surreptitious attempt by President 
Obasanjo to secure a third term in office through a constitutional amendment. The 
bid generated furore among the political elite and serious opposition from the 
public. The country breathed a sigh of relief at the rejection of the attempt by the 
legislature on 16 May, 2006.85 The Plaintiff, the incumbent Vice-President who 
                                                 
82 Electoral Act Case note 67 supra at 186-187. 
83 (2007) 4 NILR 202. Available at:http://www.nigeria-law.org/LawReporting2007.htm  
84 Gilbert da Costa “Nigerian Senate Denies Obasanjo Third Term” Voice of America available at: 
  http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-05/2006-05-16-
voa68.cfm?CFID=269274608&CFTOKEN=30412515 (last accessed 6 March 2008). 
85 Editorial “Triumph of The National Assembly” This Day (Abuja Wednesday 17 May 2006) 
available at: http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id=48372 (last accessed 11 March 2008). 
See also Daniel K Posner and Daniel J Young “The Institutionalization of Political Power in 
Africa” (2007) 18 (3) Journal of Democracy 126, 127. 
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 had never hidden his ambition to succeed President Obasanjo stood up boldly to 
be counted in the opposition ranks. He publicly denounced the Third Term 
Project. Thus an open rift developed between him and the President.  
   In the heat of a series of verbal altercations between the two, the Plaintiff 
also made disparaging comments on the government’s programmes and policies. 
At a point, the President ordered him out of the Federal Executive Council 
meeting. He was suspended from the ruling PDP in September 2006 for three 
months and later expelled. In December 2006, he declared his membership of the 
Action Congress (AC) and his presidential candidature on its platform for the 
2007 elections.  
Attempts by President Obasanjo to move the National Assembly to 
remove the Plaintiff as Vice-President were stoutly resisted by loyalists of the 
latter who had a strong following there. Eventually, President Obasanjo declared 
the office of the Plaintiff, who was on holiday outside the country, vacant. He was 
also to be tried for corruption and abuse of office on his return. The President then 
notified the 3rd-6th Defendants of his intention to send a nominee to replace the 
Plaintiff.  
   President Obasanjo premised his action on, among others, the disloyalty 
of the Vice-President (who had by then defected to another party), to the PDP and 
the Presidency. The Plaintiff filed this action to challenge his purported removal 
and the withdrawal of all his privileges, entitlements, rights and benefits as the 
Vice-President of Nigeria. He sought, inter alia, judicial declarations that the 
President had no power under the 1999 Constitution or any other law, to declare 
the office of Vice-President vacant and that his term subsists till 29 May 2007, in 
consonance with the constitutional stipulation of four-year tenure.  
The suit was filed on 4 January 2007 at the Court of Appeal in line with 
section 239 of the Constitution vested with original jurisdiction on issues relating 
to the cessation and vacancy of the offices of president and vice-president. On 20 
February 2007, the Court of Appeal decided in favour of the Plaintiff. It declared 
as illegal, unconstitutional and void, the President’s declaration of vacancy in the 
office of the Vice-President.   
On the issue of the Vice-President’s defection to a rival, newly-formed 
party, the Action Congress (AC), the Court of Appeal cited the freedom of 
association in support of the Plaintiff’s action. Dissatisfied, the Attorney-General 
of the Federation (1st Appellant/Defendant) on behalf of the Federal Government 
and two others, appealed to the Supreme Court (the Court).  
In support of the case for the Federal Government (under the leadership of 
President Obasanjo), the 1st Defendant argued that a vice-president ought to act as 
an associate of, a ‘co-pilot’ with the president and not antagonise the latter. Where 
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 the Vice-President no longer feels comfortable in this role, he must first resign his 
office before he can validly criticise the President or even join another party. To 
allow otherwise would tantamount to defeating the intention of the drafters of the 
Constitution. The 1st Defendant further argued that the Plaintiffs action in 
decamping to a rival political party, after resignation from the party that 
sponsored his candidature, should be construed as an automatic resignation from 
his position as Vice-President.86  
   The 1st Defendant complained about what it considered the narrow 
construction placed by the Court of Appeal on the totality of the provisions 
relating to the tenure, resignation and vacancy of the office of vice-president. The 
1st Defendant contended it would amount to foisting an absurdity on the 
presidency and the mechanism of governance at the highest level, to allow the 
Plaintiff ride on the crest of the gap in the constitution and continue in office in 
the light of the foregoing facts.  
The narrow interpretation and the absurd result it produces, it was 
contended, could not be the intendment of the drafters of the Constitution. In 
refutation, it was argued for the Plaintiff that the Constitution does not envisage a 
relationship of ‘master and servant’ between the president and vice-president 
since both positions are individual offices created by the Constitution. 87  
Thus, the main issue for determination by the Supreme Court was the 
nature of the relationship between the President and Vice-President. Perhaps more 
crucially, what should happen where there is a breakdown in the (expected) 
harmonious relationship between the two?  
   In its consideration of the issues, the Court affirmed its jurisprudential 
preference for the literal, plain-fact interpretation of statutes including 
constitutions.88 It then outlined other cardinal interpretive parameters that must be 
observed in the intricate task of judicial interpretation.  
One of these is the need to consider the history of the legislation in issue 
where that would assist the understanding of the Court in its interpretation of the 
relevant law. The Court stated that consideration of the historical circumstances of 
legislation assists in the determination of legislative intent. Another factor that 
must be considered in constitutional interpretation is the need to be liberal in 
construing the provisions of the Constitution.  It is also germane in constitutional 
adjudication to bear in mind, the ‘susceptibilities of the Nigerian society.’89  
   The Court noted that the offices of President and Vice-President are 
creations of the constitution. But unlike the United States and Indian 
                                                 
86 Atiku v Obasanjo note 83 supra at 11. 
87 Ibid.  
88  For a critique of the literal, plain-fact jurisprudential approach in the context of a post-
authoritarian transition see Yusuf note 77 supra at 3-22. 
89 Atiku v Obasanjo note 83 supra at 22. 
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 constitutions, the Nigerian Constitution of 1999 vested all executive powers of the 
federation on the President without assigning any role to the Vice-President. The 
executive powers are to be exercised by the President directly, through ministers 
of the government and officers in the public service of the federation. Thus, the 
role of the Vice-President is limited to the specific duties assigned to him by the 
President, just like ministers and other officials of the Federal Government.90 
  The Court however stated a crucial distinction in the position of the Vice-
President and the ministers of the government. Unlike the ministers of the 
government, the President can not remove the Vice-President from office at will, 
except in accordance with the provisions of section 143 of the Constitution which 
also provides for the procedure for the removal of the President. A requirement of 
the section in this regard, is that a case of gross misconduct must be established 
against the Vice-President in proceedings initiated and conducted by the National 
Assembly. Judicial intervention regarding the proceedings on the matter before 
the National Assembly are ousted by section 143 (10) of the constitution.91  
   In the lead judgement, Kutigi JSC held that since the two were elected 
under a joint ticket, the Constitution envisaged a single executive and a unity of 
purpose and conduct in the presidency that transcends the election. According to 
the Court, the relationship must persist throughout the joint term of the President 
and Vice-President. It faulted the position of the Court of Appeal on the 
prerogative of the Plaintiff to exercise of his fundamental rights of expression and 
association as valid basis for joining another party while maintaining his position 
as Vice-President.  
   He had to resign his position before he could join and campaign on the 
platform of another party for the position of President. The Court further held that 
as incumbent Vice-President, the Plaintiff was precluded from criticising the 
policies of the federal executive. It stated that the fact of suspension or expulsion 
from the ruling party did not justify that course of action. Even after his 
resignation, the Vice-President can not dissociate himself from collective 
responsibility for the decisions taken by the cabinet when he was in office.  
   But it maintained it was not the duty of the Court to pronounce on the 
propriety or otherwise, of the actions or behaviour of the Plaintiff in the case. It 
similarly had no power to declare his office vacant for whatever reason. It 
however affirmed the position of the Court of Appeal that the power to remove 
the Vice-President was also ultra-vires the President, rejecting the argument of 
constructive resignation presented by the 1st Defendant. The power to do both 
resided exclusively with the legislature, the National Assembly.92  
                                                 
90 Ibid. at 12. 
91 Atiku v Obasanjo note 83 supra at 12-13. 
92 Ibid. at 15 
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 The vacillation of the National Assembly to act on the matter, canvassed 
by the 1st Defendant, was in the opinion of the Court, not sufficient justification of 
the unilateral action of President Obasanjo to declare the office of the Vice-
President vacant. The President or the executive branch of government was not 
conferred with the powers to fill the void on an issue clearly within the 
constitutional competence of the National Assembly.  
The Court concluded that in the event the Vice-President’s tenure had yet 
to expire and since he was not removed from or resigned his office as 
constitutionally provided, he was entitled to continue in office. Like Pontius 
Pilate, the Court, in the lead judgement, washed its hands off the case with the 
concurrence of the other six justices of the panel of seven. However, and this is a 
point we return to shortly, the seeming unanimity of the justices on closer 
scrutiny, is more of a concurrence of result than process. There was dissent on a 
significant aspect of the case, the tension between fundamental rights and 
collective duty.  
 
When Elephants Fight- Neglect, Democracy and Due Process 
The importance of this decision on the politics of a troubled transition in 
Nigeria can not be overemphasised. Although the instance of political 
disagreement and power struggle between President Obasanjo and his deputy, 
Atiku Abubakar was the most prominent virtually, the only one resolved by 
judicial intervention, it was by no means the only instance of executive power 
bickering in high places in the country. Many state governors were at loggerheads 
with their deputies in similar succession disputes.  
As a consequence of the dispute between the two highest officers of state, 
there were violent clashes between supporters of their two factions. Public 
administration at both the federal and state levels were seriously impeded or 
completely stalled. The ruling party was seriously polarised and this generated 
schisms even in the national and state legislatures. Alliances were formed across 
political divides that kept the country on crisis-alert. The political crisis 
occasioned palpable vacuums in governance, loss of lives, resources and property.  
Even fragile, and at the best of times, less than optimal emergency relief 
services were not spared the vagaries of the power tussle between President 
Obasanjo and Vice-President Atiku Abubabar. Recent congressional hearings in 
the National Assembly revealed that the National Emergency Management 
Authority (NEMA), one of the agencies under the withdrawn schedule of duties 
of Vice President Atiku had its yearly allocation for 2007 withheld and was thus 
crippled for a whole year. Appeals to the President for rectification of the dire 
situation did not produce results. 93 This is only an indicative instance of a series 
                                                 
93 ‘Obasanjo/Atiku Rift Crippled NEMA’ This Day (Abuja Saturday 19 January 2008) available 
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 of officially-induced neglect and abdication of responsibility on the part of the 
political elite in public governance.  
   The economy suffered greatly from the factionalisation and publicly 
conducted struggle for power among public officials. The business of legislation 
and legislative oversight of executive action stalled or moved at snail speed as a 
result of political fragmentation that trailed executive disagreements and 
contestations for power in high places. All of these were happening in a country 
that had been victim of decades of pillage and misgovernance by the military and 
their civilian acolytes. The diversion of attention from salient issues of 
governance led to deprivations of the benefits of democratic governance referred 
to in Nigerian political as the ‘dividends of democracy.’  
   A critical aspect of the case is the insistence on what the Court regarded 
as due constitutional process in the removal of the Vice-President. While issue 
may be taken with the desirability of a literal interpretation as the appropriate 
jurisprudential approach in a transitional context,94 especially granted the position 
of the Court that judges ought to consider the ‘susceptibilities’ of the society in 
adjudication,95 it is, as noted above, very important for the democratic process and 
governance in the country that due process be entrenched in the body politic.  
   A situation where the President or governor, frustrated in the face of a 
stalemate in his attempts to unseat his deputy due to political differences, resorts 
to all sorts of underhand tactics and neglect of governance at the highest levels is 
to be unequivocally deprecated. Such a position is even more apposite in a 
country whose economy and basic social infrastructure relies heavily on the 
public sector. Inaction in the public sector has dire consequences for socio-
economic well being of the country.  
  For sure, executive bickering and high (negative) politics witnessed in 
the Obasanjo/Atiku conflict, imperilled societal aspirations for development and 
the rule of law in a polity where a top-down approach is a customised form of 
political expression of power. The top-down power dynamic is a crucial factor in 
public and private governance in Nigeria.  
Notwithstanding its constitutionally stipulated federal status, the plenitude 
of powers constitutionally conferred on the federal government, largely exercised 
through an executive presidency ensures a socio-political and economic dynamic 
in which when the President (or the presidency) sneezes, the whole country 
catches a cold. This results from the unitarisation of the country by successive 
military administrations that paid lip-service to the federal status of the country 
but concentrated political and economic powers at the centre in consonance with 
command-structured military ethos.96 
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 Robes on Tight Ropes 
A remarkable feature of Atiku v Obasanjo is the way it demonstrates the 
tight rope judges tread in adjudicating the sphere of ‘mega’ or ‘pure politics’ in 
the world of new constitutionalism. 97 The waters, so to speak, of judicialised 
adjudication in established democracies can be quite rough a la Bush v Gore.98 
But in transitional contexts with inevitable institutional quagmires, the waters of 
judicialised adjudication can be quite treacherous. Recall the consequentialist 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in its holding that the Nigerian Constitution 
required the unity of the President and Vice-President to be transcendental, 
reaching beyond the joint-electoral mandate to actual governance.  
However, the lead judgement refrained from asserting the illegality of the 
action of a Vice-President who it agreed had departed from the constitutionally 
envisioned relationship. This was an incumbent Vice-President who joined 
another political party and openly declared his presidential candidature of a party 
not even in existence when he was elected on a different political platform. He 
thus abandoned the party on whose mandate he was Vice-President to not only 
contest the constitutionality of his associate, the President, but also, actualise his 
own ambition.  
Vice-President Atiku had openly confronted the President and refused to 
resign his membership of the party that sponsored their joint-candidature. Even 
more, he did not resign his position as Vice-President of a government whose 
policies he turned round to openly criticise after six years in office. It is pertinent 
to note that all these were happening in a system where it is a constitutional 
requirement that candidates for elective office are party-sponsored.  
   Notice how the court navigated, albeit with questionable deftness, the 
balance between fundamental individual rights and highly moral questions of 
collective political responsibility. It is quite instructive that while the lead 
judgement refrained from commenting on the consequences of the Vice-
President’s acts of disloyalty to the President, Justice Onnoghen in one of the six 
                                                 
97 Hirschl note 1 supra.  
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 concurring decisions, went as far as to suggest that the actions of the Vice-
President, in defecting to another party and castigating the administration of 
which he was a part, could amount to gross misconduct as defined by section 143 
(11) of the Constitution which lays down the circumstances under which the 
National Assembly could remove the Vice-President.  
In a less restrained tone than the lead judgement, Onnoghen JSC declared 
that ‘what amounts to gross misconduct…is wide enough to include the situation 
we find ourselves in this case.’ 99 Onnoghen JSC’s dicta not only negate the rather 
evasive attitude of the Court in confronting a delicate political situation headlong; 
it also had the potential to ignite the ‘political solutions to political problems,’100 
(his description of relevant constitutional provisions on the matter) proposition 
His Lordship ventured further:  
Even though a situation of defection of the Vice President from the 
party which sponsored his election into that office to another 
political party does not  form part of the grounds for removal of 
the said Vice President particularly by  court process, it could 
amount to gross misconduct as defined by section 143 (11) of the 
199 Constitution.101 
These are by no means innocuous obiter dicta in the context of the volatile 
political situation in Nigeria at the relevant time. It is quite plausible to contend 
that it took the strong political following of the Vice-President in the National 
Assembly and the history of a rather frosty relationship between President 
Obasanjo and the legislature to firmly shut out recourse to the tentative judicially 
sanctioned lead on removing the Vice-President from office. 
 
Fundamental Rights versus Collective Duty   
At the least, the tenor of Onnoghen JSC’s decision, though in concurrence, 
was in tension with the overall neutral position of the Court as laid out in the lead 
judgement. It is quite interesting in this regard that others like Tabai JSC who 
though in similar concurrence, also delivered a detailed opinion, disagreed with 
the view that the Plaintiff’s movement to another political party constituted gross 
misconduct as envisaged under section 143 of the Constitution.102 Interestingly 
too, while Mohammed JSC condemned as ‘unconscionable and immoral,’ the 
actions of the Plaintiff in moving to another party and criticising the policies of an 
administration he was a part of at the relevant time, he found nothing illegal in it.  
The latter had no difficulty in according the Plaintiff the exercise of his 
fundamental right of association as provided under section 40 of the Constitution. 
                                                 
99 Atiku v Obasanjo note 83 supra at 36. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid.  
102 Atiku v Obasanjo note 83 at 48. 
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 On this, he affirmed the position of the Court of Appeal on a point deprecated in 
the lead judgement of Akintan JSC. In fact, it would, in the view of Mohammed 
JSC, amount to an ‘illegality, injustice and constitutionality’ to refuse or deny a 
citizen such a right.103 He was supported in his views by Aderemi JSC.104  
Such is the sometimes variegated jurisprudence that emerges in cases that 
combine political importance with fundamental novelty in the adjudicatory 
jurisdiction and scarce precedent for reference in comparative constitutionalism. 
Notably in this regard, one of the justices declared the complete absence of any 
precedent on the peculiar facts of the case.105 
   Suffice it to say the view that the Vice-President must be regarded as a 
relatively free agent rather than an appendage of the President, incapable of 
independent thought, is in consonance with the decision of the Court in an earlier 
and equally important transition case. In People’s Democratic Party v 
Independent National Electoral Commission (PDP v INEC)106 the central issue in 
the case turned on the legal status of the governor-elect and the deputy governor-
elect under rather unusual circumstances.  
In PDP v INEC the former voluntarily relinquished his position before 
inauguration and his deputy sought to be sworn in as governor. This was opposed 
by the electoral commission and the party that lost the election. The Court held 
that though the two were elected on a mandatory joint ticket, they were sui 
generis and acquired independent rights. The Court stated that after their victory 
at the elections, the two did not ‘swim or sink together for all purposes.’ Rather, 
they were free to chart independent courses including the prerogative of one of 
them not to take office for which they were elected.107  
It is interesting to note that only one of the learned justices referred to this 
relevant case in considering the ambit of a Vice-President’s independence of 
action or status under the constitution. This was despite the important fact that the 
duo, president and the vice-president, as well as governor and deputy governor, 
hold office (and can be removed) under similarly worded impari materia 
constitutional provisions. The near-total inadvertence of the Court to its own 
precedent is a likely consequence of the parallel jurisprudential approach in the 
two decisions. While the Court declared its preference for a ‘purposive’ 
jurisprudence in PDP v INEC, it treaded a declared part of plain-fact, literal 
interpretation in Atiku v Obasanjo. 
                                                 
103 Ibid. at 53-57. 
104 Ibid.  at 63. 
105 Aderemi JSC, Atiku v Obasanjo note 83 supra at 61. 
106 PDP v INEC (1999) 11 NWLR pt 625, 200. See Yusuf note 71 supra for an evaluation of this 
case.  
107 Ibid. at 265. 
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    It is equally important that in invoking the notion of ‘collective 
responsibility’ the Court, perhaps unwittingly, sought to extend the scope of the 
Code of Conduct for Public Officers (the Code) provided in the Constitution. In 
this endeavour, the Court engaged with a ‘primarily deep moral’ and political 
question rather than one of a judicial nature.108 
 It is relevant to state that although Nigeria’s constitutions of 1979 and 
1999 contain the Code as part of its schedules, the clearest expression of the 
existence and operation of it has been the creation of a Code of Conduct Tribunal 
with jurisdiction largely on verification and trial of public officials on matters 
relating to false declaration of or illegal acquisition of assets. 
 The Code is silent on political responsibility as suggested or conceived by 
the Court in Atiku v Obasanjo. Further, there is no legislation in the country that 
establishes a clear or even strictly implied legal concept of collective 
responsibility as enunciated in the case. 109  The concept, which sits more 
comfortably in the parliamentary political arrangement though elucidated by some 
prominent constitutional scholars110 in the country, has yet to be given serious 
recognition in practice within Nigeria’s presidential political arrangement.  
   Thus, Atiku v Obasanjo discloses certain friction between black letter 
law and strong unwritten ethics and codes of expected political behaviour which 
the Court at first blush resolved in favour of the former. However, characteristic 
of the judicial dilemma when confronted with overtly political questions, the 
resolution was not without skirmishes that left some doubt as to the clarity of the 
judicial leaning in the case. The judicial affirmation of the principle or more 
properly stated, enunciation of it in the absence of clearly stated constitutional or 
statutory foundations, is in tension with iterations of judicial deference recurrent 
in the judgements of all the justices who proffered a detailed opinion,111 to the 
political branches which undergird the decision in Atiku v Obasanjo.    
 
 
    
                                                 
108 Hirschl note 1 supra at 728. 
109 It is noteworthy that President Obasanjo took the unprecedented step of having his ministers 
and special advisers subscribe to a ‘Code of Conduct’ which was clearly aspirational since it was 
meant to ‘assist’ the ministerial appointees to uphold the constitutional provisions on the Code of 
Conduct for Public Officers in Schedule V of the Constitution. Its legal enforceability is thus in 
doubt. In any event, it is instructive that it excluded the Vice-President, an implicit recognition of 
his distinct status. 
110 Benjamin Nwabueze Constitutional Democracy in Africa-Forms of Government  Vol.4 78-79 
(Spectrum Books Ibadan 2004) 
111 The stern warnings of Aderemi JSC are perhaps the most representative of these dicta. See 
Atiku v Obasanjo note 77 supra at 66 (‘…foraging into the exclusive territory of the legislators 
would make the judiciary lose its authority and legitimacy…Let there be no incursion by one of 
government into that of the other.’). 
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 Courts in the Web- Law, Morals and Politics 
A fundamental moral and political issue was swept under the carpet in the 
decisions of both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in Atiku v 
Obasanjo.  
Briefly articulated, it is the subversion of the democratic will of the majority 
expressed in the election of the President and Vice-President on the joint ticket of 
the PDP. This issue derives from the position canvassed by the 1st Defendant that 
an affirmative decision on propriety of the Plaintiff retaining his position as Vice-
President on the facts of the case would lead to anti-majoritarian consequences.  
Specifically, it engenders the real possibility that the country could be 
ruled by a person who has abandoned the manifesto and ideology of the party on 
the strength of which he was elected, having decamped to a party with a different 
ideology and manifesto. This was of course in the event that the incumbent, for 
any of a number of reasons, ceases to hold office.  
Observers of the Nigerian political scene would not dismiss this latter 
possibility lightly. In fact, President Obasanjo had faced two previous serious 
attempts at removing him from office. Let’s assume (for a moment) that President 
Obasanjo left office before the end of his term and he is succeeded, as 
constitutionally envisaged by Vice-President Atiku. Given the prevailing 
dissension at the presidency, would such a situation not constitute an antithesis of 
the principle of majority rule? Certainly, the millions of people who reportedly 
voted for the joint-candidacy of Obasanjo/Atiku, under electoral arrangements 
where valid candidature is premised on sponsorship by a political party, must be 
notionally taken to have endorsed the programmes of the party in question and 
expect each of the candidates to be bound to implementing their (party) 
manifesto?   
   It is pertinent to note that this issue formed a key part of the case made 
for the 1st Defendant. It constituted the basis for Federal Government’s insistence 
on the constructive resignation from office by the Plaintiff for which the latter 
should be estopped from denying. It is discomfiting that the courts sidestepped the 
issue, its customary preference for the literal jurisprudential approach to the 
interpretation of legislation. 
 However, the silence of the courts on this admittedly thorny issue again 
reflects a fundamental dilemma of the judiciary in the complicated terrain of 
adjudicating politics. Courts are caught in the web of resolving difficult moral and 
highly (divisive) political questions. The increasingly moral and political 
questions the judiciary is confronted with can sometimes not be resolved by 
recourse to black letter law. In such circumstances, there is a high possibility of, 
at the least, implicit reference back to politics and society at large. This is 
precisely what the Supreme Court in Atiku v Obasanjo emphasised when it 
declared per Aderemi JSC that: 
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 It may be said that the act or conduct of the Vice-President in 
defecting to the Action Congress after he has won the ticket on 
the platform of the P.D.P for that position is morally 
reprehensible. But until the law (in this case, the Constitution) 
declares the defection unlawful and prescribes in clear 
language punishment for such an act, there is nothing anybody 
can do. The remedy, if there is one, lies in the hands of the 
legislators. It must always be noted that what is morally 
reprehensible may not be legally punishable.112   
 
 
Judicialisation of politics – the driving force  
It is pertinent to note that a political environment conducive to the judicialisation 
of politics in Nigeria is provided by the enigmatic prevalence of a democratically 
elected but authoritarian executive presidency. The phenomenon, referred to by 
Prempeh as the ‘imperial presidency,’113 which has continued to plague African 
countries, despite the ‘new wave’ democratic transition, found extensive 
expression in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007.  
      The Nigerian experience of an imperial presidency derives essentially 
from a history of military authoritarianism. The military modelled governance and 
the distribution of power in a centrifugal construct that consistent with its 
institutional command-based operational structure. The country witnessed an 
accelerated, convergence of powers in a dictator at the centre.  
This was anathema in a polity which had gained independence with a 
strong regionalised federal structure in many important aspects of governance. 
With the country’s infant post-independent democratic structures sacked by 
military adventurism perpetuated with brief intervals of civil governance for the 
better part of four decades,114 the military eventually left power through a non-
negotiated transition. It bequeathed a constitutional legacy of a centre saddled 
exclusively or in concurrence with the federating states, with almost every aspect 
of governance. The foregoing context of political power contestations has led to 
an exponential and unprecedented incidence of judicialisation of politics in the 
country.  
It is significant to note that the trend towards judicialisation of politics has 
yet to abate. The fodder for the phenomenon has been abundantly provided by the 
                                                 
112 Atiku v Obasanjo note 83 supra at 63. 
113 H Kwasi Prempeh “Presidential Power in Comparative Perspective: The Puzzling Persistence 
of Imperial Presidency in Post-Authoritarian Africa” (2007) SSRN Working Papers Series 
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015369 (last accessed 11 February 2008). 
114 By 1999 when the military relinquished power, the military had ruled the country for three 
decades of its thirty nine years post independence. 
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 seriously flawed electoral process that hallmarked the hand-over of power by one 
civilian administration to another. This suggests deficient legitimacy of the 
political class is another important motivation for the judicialisation of politics. 
  
Politicisation of the judiciary  
In the light of the foregoing account of active judicial mediation of politics and its 
replication in many other instances, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria was nominated ‘Man of the Year’ by The Daily Independent, 115  a 
respected national daily. This is no doubt in recognition of the critical judicial role 
in shaping pathologies of stabilisation in a floundering political transition, 
upholding constitutionalism, rule of law and ultimately, staving-off customary 
excuses for military incursions in the governance of the country.  
The Supreme Court, in particular, has received commendation from 
home116 and even unusual quarters abroad, including the United States Congress 
and the London based The Economist for its demonstration of independence, 
redirecting the country’s democracy away from the precipice and upholding 
human rights.117 The profile of the Supreme Court in governance in the country 
has become more conspicuously writ in the public consciousness like never 
before. As respected professor and former dean of law of one of the foremost law 
schools in the country stated, the Court has sent out a signal that it is the 
‘sentinel…guard for democracy and good governance.’118     
    But the foregoing account would be incomplete if it presents a picture of 
a model and reformed judiciary, particularly in view of the glaring absence of 
                                                 
115Onyema Omenuwa “2007: The Year of the Supreme Court” The Daily Independent Online 
Edition (Lagos Thursday 27 December 2007) available at 
 http://www.independentngonline.com/?c=129&a=7908 (February 20 2008). 
116 See “Belgore, Oputa, Sagay, Others Hail Supreme Court” The Guardian Online Edition (Lagos 
Sunday 24 June 2007) available at: http://www.nigerians-abroad.com/news/headlines/belgore-
oputa-sagay-others-hail-supreme-court/ (Last accessed 18 February 2008). 
117 Constance Ikokwu “Nigerian Judiciary Strong, Independent, Says US Congress” This Day 
Online Edition (Abuja Thursday 19 July 2007) available at:  
http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id=84004 (last accessed 18 February 2008) and  
“Nigeria- Democracy by Court Order” The Economist (London Thursday 24 January 2008) 
available at: 
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10567560&fsrc=RSS (last accessed 11 
May 2008). But cf. Mo Ibrahim Foundation Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2007 available 
at: http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/index/index2.asp (last accessed 18th February 2007) in 
which the country ranked a dismal 37 in a continental survey of 48 countries on issues of rule of 
law, judicial independence, human rights, etc.  
118 Charles Adingupu “Obi’s Judgement is Warning to Political Gangsters” The Guardian Online 
Edition (Lagos Sunday 24 June 2007) available at:  
http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/ArchiveIndex07_html?pdate=240607&SUBMIT=Submit  
(last accessed 18 February 2008). 
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 judicial accountability as part of the transitional justice measures in the country.119 
Notwithstanding public acclaim of the judicial role in Nigeria’s democratisation 
process, judicial malfeasance, particularly in the lower courts, has continued in a 
manner that undermines the image of self-reformation otherwise presented by an 
evaluation of the judicial activity at the highest level in the country.  
Perhaps the most topical concern about the judiciary is the continued 
incidence of corruption and attendant questionable adjudication, especially in the 
high courts, and sometimes, the Court of Appeal. There were confirmed incidents 
of corruption on the part of some judges who adjudicated at the various elections 
petitions tribunals all over the country in the aftermath of the 2003 elections.120 
This led to the dismissal of a number of judges. Conscious of the damage this has 
done to the image of the judiciary, the President of the Court of Appeal, the 
second highest court in the country, while inaugurating the election tribunals for 
the 2007 elections, warned judges against being compromised by politicians.121  
Allegations of judicial turpitude that dodged the steps and compromised 
the adjudication of the 2003 elections in the country have returned in even more 
sinister dimensions. In this respect, the recent decision of the Presidential 
Elections Petition Tribunal composed of 5 Court of Appeal Court Justices has not 
escaped the common allegations of corruption.122 The situation was not helped by 
the unusual and comical style, both in content and delivery, of the judgement.  
    While the veracity of such damaging claims remains in doubt, the 
opposition parties decried the judgement for being perverse.123 In agreement, the 
leadership of the Transition Monitoring Group, a national coalition of some 
leading non-governmental organisations that monitored the elections, alongside 
international observers dismissed the decision as ‘A Charter for Dishonest 
Elections.’124  
                                                 
119 For an analysis of the relevance of judicial accountability in transitions and the Nigerian 
context as a case study see Hakeem O Yusuf  “Calling the Judiciary to Account for the Past: 
Transitional Justice and Judicial Accountability in Nigeria.” (2008)  30 (2) Law and Policy 194.  
120 Oko Okechukwu “Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An Analysis of the Problems and 
Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria,” (2006) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 9. 
121 Efe Ebelo “ Abdullahi’s Salvo At Politicians” The Daily Independent Online Edition (Lagos 
Thursday 27 December 2007) available at: 
http://www.independentngonline.com/?c=137&a=7938 (last accessed 16 March 2008). 
122 Sahara Reporters New York “How the Presidential Elections Petition Tribunal Came to its 
Decision” Nigerian Muse available at:  
http://www.nigerianmuse.com/nigeriawatch/2007/How_the_Presidential_Elections_Petition_Tribu
nal_Came_To_Its_Controversial_Verdict  (last accessed 4 March 2008). 
123  CNPP “Presidential Elections Petition Tribunal, A Betrayal of Democracy” available at: 
http://www.saharareporters.com/www/report/detail/?id=516 (last accessed 4 March 2008). 
124  Ayo Obe ‘A Charter for Dishonest Elections’ Nigerian Muse available at: 
http://www.nigerianmuse.com/nigeriawatch/2007/A_Charter_for_Dishonest_Elections_Essay_by_
Ayo_Obe (last accessed 4 March 2008). 
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 The persistence of real or imagined corruption in the judiciary is a product 
of the existential continuity of the institution in the transition process. This will 
arguably remain the case, as long as the matter of judicial accountability for past 
complicity remains completely ignored or at least, under-addressed.  
   Not unrelated to deep-seated public distrust for the judiciary at the lower 
levels, is the preference for ‘appellate justice.’ By this is meant the high tendency 
to appeal unsatisfactory judgements by a party in litigation. Litigants commonly 
regard the trial courts as ‘clearance houses’ for obtaining justice through the 
judicial process. The propensity has led to an attendant high volume of appeals in 
the appellate dockets in the country.  
   The attitude is generally that it is easier to influence the court of first 
instance almost but not always presided by a single judge. Even in cases like the 
electoral petitions matters composed of 3 or 5 member-panels, the attitude was the 
same. It had for instance been the position of all parties to the consolidated 
presidential elections petition that irrespective of the outcome, there will be an 
appeal to the Supreme Court vested with appellate jurisdiction over the high-
powered Tribunal, itself composed of 5 Justice of the Court of Appeal. And it was 
no surprise that the Petitioners immediately appealed the decision.125 Thus the 
Supreme Court appears to be the lone judicial institution that currently enjoys the 
new found confidence in the judiciary in Nigeria’s transition. 
   However, public confidence even in the integrity of the Supreme Court 
itself must not be overstated. Apart from the relative infancy of such confidence, 
the Supreme Court itself has not been spared the vagaries of adjudicating 
politically charged cases. Thus, it was nearly brought into disrepute in its 
upholding of the lower courts decision findings that a then serving-governor was 
not an ex-convict in the Ibori Case even when the judge who convicted him had 
given evidence at the trial of the matter in that he was the person convicted. It was 
generally believed that the Court had been improperly influenced by the 
Presidency who supported the governor against all odds.  
It was further alleged by the complainant in the case that the then Chief 
Justice of Nigeria who presided over the case and some of the other justices who 
sat on the panel, had collected a bribe from the governor. Surprisingly, the 
disturbing allegation made in open court, did not earn him a citation for contempt. 
Rather, the Court invited Interpol to investigate the matter but nothing untoward 
was discovered against the justices. This particular case still haunts the Court as it 
recently emerged that the ex-governor as well as his wife had in fact been 
                                                 
125 Ise-Oluwa Ige “Buhari Files Appeal at Supreme Court” Vanguard Online (Lagos Monday 3 
March 2008) 
available at: 
http://www.nigerianmuse.com/nigeriawatch/2007/Buhari_defies_governors_files_appeal_at_S_Co
urt (last accessed 11 May 2008) 
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 convicted of similar crimes alleged by at least two other courts in the United 
Kingdom.126 
The foregoing instantiations of political interventions in and public focus 
on the judicial process draws attention to the fault lines of the country’s judicial 
institutional design. They have become accentuated by factors relating to an 
accountability gap (both judicial and administrative) of its governance in the 
period of authoritarian rule. Institutional positioning of the Nigerian judiciary, in 
the context of a volatile democratisation process, leaves it predisposed to 
politicisation.  
 
Conclusion  
A notable feature of the judicialisation of politics is the ability and willingness of 
courts to limit legislative action. 127  While the Nigerian experience has not 
significantly diverged from this paradigm, the account of the judicialisation of 
politics in the country discloses it has had more profound resonance for 
governance in the way it has impacted executive actions in governance. The 
phenomenon has been distinctly discernible in adjudication of disputes on the 
intersection of individual rights with public interests in a troubled transition from 
authoritarianism.  
The impact of the  judicial role in transitioning polities, from Central and 
Eastern Europe through to South East Asia and Africa, briefly outlined above, 
supports the position that it is critical to the democratisation process, to ensure the 
judiciary is properly positioned for the transition from a troubled past. It is only 
then that it can be expected to take on the serious challenges of definitive, 
purposeful judicial governance required for strengthening the democratising 
transitioning polity. It is easily the case that newly established constitutional 
courts have played a significant role in deepening democracy. The courts, through 
a particular form of judicial activism, are securing the core values of the 
constitution and human rights.128  
The analyses here suggests the Supreme Court has taken a strategic 
position in the task of democratic institutional building and the reinstitution of 
                                                 
126 Dickson Omonode “Supreme Court Justices Panic over Ibori” National Day available: 
http://www.nigerianmuse.com/nigeriawatch/Supreme_Court_Justices_panic_over_Ibori (last 
accessed 4 March 2008). However, following a complaint by the Nigeria Bar Association, the 
complainant, a lawyer and his counsel, were recently debarred by the Disciplinary Committee of 
the Bar Council. See Tobi Soniyi and Tony Amokeodo “Two Lawyers barred from Practice” The 
Punch on the Web (Lagos Tuesday 22 April 2008) available at: 
http://www.punchontheweb.com/Articl.aspx?theartic=Art200804221304975 
127 Ferejohn note 6 supra at 41. 
128  Margit Cohn and Mordechai Kremnitzer “Judicial Activism: A Multidimensional Model” 
(2005) 18 Canadian Journal of law and Jurisprudence 333, 348-351. 
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 rule of law in the country to the acclaim of the public in the country. The account 
also discloses that the judiciary, in the course of its numerous interventions, has 
not only been drawn into overly political disputes that overreach its 
jurisprudential preferences, but is itself still challenged by the morass of 
institutional dysfunctions carried over from the authoritarian era. The situational 
dynamics leads back to the need for closer scrutiny of the judicial function in 
transitional societies. 
The tentative lines of the course of judicialisation of politics in Nigeria can 
be drawn from the position of the Supreme Court, considering its pride of place in 
the judicial system. But it would be simply misleading to read off it, the current 
state of the judiciary in the country as a whole. The outline of the judicialisation 
of politics discussed here differs from what is seen in the courts below.  
Despite a few commendable handling of critical and overtly political 
matters, the manner of adjudication and independence of the lower courts remain 
quite unsatisfactory. The Supreme Court itself is still enmeshed in controversies 
that speak to the dilemma of an unscrutinised past, a feature of transitional justice 
in Nigeria and elsewhere.  
In democratising and established liberal democratic societies alike, 
protestations of deficient democratic credentials have surprisingly being 
ineffectual in curbing the geometric increase in, and sometimes preference for, 
judicial determination and control of public policy as well as highly political and 
moral questions. If anything, apolitical perceptions of the courts seem to fuel it.  
The immense powers wielded by the judiciary over key policy aspects of 
governance, especially in the contemporary new constitutionalism, strongly 
suggests the need for closer and more systematised scrutiny of the judicial 
function. This is even more pertinent in transitional societies contending with 
‘reinvented’ centres of power while simultaneously responding to the 
establishment of new judicial institutions which predictably attract considerable 
support from various publics. Everywhere, the ever-widening reach of the courts 
in governance and public decision-making has left little to the doubt that the men 
in (usually) dark robes are treading with new confidence, the unpredictable ropes 
of power.  
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